“Ethiopianism,” The “Neo-Official-Nationalism,” and
the “Oromia First!” Trend
(Assefa
Tefera Dibaba, PhD, Indiana University)
Sangaan gowwaa dha, harka isa tume harraaba, jedhan.
[A bull is fool, it licks the very hand that castrated it.]
____Oromo Saying
Introduction
This
paper is in response to a request made repeatedly to give my personal accounts on
and observation of the political culture and the current uncertainty looming in
Ethiopia. Toward this goal, the paper aims, in the current Ethiopia’s context a)
to critique the historical and contemporary factors that led to the ongoing
mythologizing (myth-making) of PM Dr Abiy Ahmed as a political hero and ideologizing
of his rhetoric (narrative) glorified as “medemer” (unity in diversity) and the
promises he is making to reverse the recent unhappy past
under the EPDRF authoritarian rule of which he has been a part for the last 27
years, to avoid the exclusionary old rule with its ethnic undertones, and to
reconstruct a new Ethiopia on the basis of “Ethiopianism” (a new-official-nationalism), b)
to assess the Oromo political ambiguity in spite of the mass struggle
intensified over the last four years led by Qeerroo, the Oromo Youth League, to
enable the Oromo determine their own future, to bring about a systemic change,
not a simple reform, I argue, as the ruling party’s (EPRDF) effort has amounted
so far to little more than a window dressing. The paper concludes by
reconsidering the ongoing euphoric fervor of “MEDEMER” (Ethiopian-ness) more as
“patriotic” sentiment than “nationalistic” stand and calling upon the
divided Oromo political voices to rejoin the common goal (kaawoo) of the nationalistic
“OROMIA FIRST!” trend, and to start to engage in an OPEN DIALOGUE at grassroots
level around WHAT THE OROMO PEOPLE WANT (not just what party leaders want), and
to move toward a NATIONAL CONSENSUS on Oromo political question.
Ethiopianism and the Neo-Official-Nationalism
Before assessing the “neo-official-nationalism”
which is evolving out of the current euphoric move, “MEDEMER” (unity in diversity),
the terminological problems “Ethiopia,” “Ethiopian-ness,”
and “Ethiopianism” must be
sorted out. Those terms are elusive concepts and difficult to pin down and to define
in the wider range of Ethiopian and Oromo Studies. In what follows, to avoid
pitfalls of a misnomer, I make an attempt to elucidate the concepts from
historical and religious perspectives.
Historically, “Ethiopianism”
is considered a cultural production of a black messiah among sub-Saharan
Africans and in the Caribbean, and has been a Pan-African religious-cum-political
string used to advocate for a political and religious freedom in the colonial
era and after (Shepperson, 1953). Ethiopianism conveyed the
African notion of independence against “all forms of racial discrimination as
practiced by Europeans,” (Lahouel 1986: 681) and against the “Christian
principles of justice and equality and the hard reality of the color bar within
the European-led churches in the South African societies” (p686). Consequently,
disillusioned by the European prejudices, Africans established their own
churches of both “Ethiopian” and “Zionist” tenet before 1937 based on African
aspirations: while the “Ethiopian” worship maintained the Christian liturgy,
the Zionist churches included traditional healing rituals and drum-beatings
(p681). Graham Duncan shares this politico-religious view of “Ethiopianism” as
a wider network of African nationalism, which is “the result of long-standing
resentment of and resistance to white domination, a direct challenge to the
ecclesiastical status quo by promoting ‘Africa for the Africans’”
(Duncan 2010:199).
From a religious perspective, the
widely acclaimed quote from the Bible is “Ethiopia
shall stretch out her hands unto God,” which is a Christian expression of Pan-Africanism
based on the text of Psalm 68:31. This perspective can be explicated from two
angles. First, some rightly argue, “Ethiopianism” is considered as a Christian “sense
of cultural and political identity amongst black
people throughout the African continent” (Duncan 2015: 199). Second, from
this view of Christian Ethiopianism, “Ethiopian roots
can be traced to biblical times and the then known regions of northern Africa”
(p199), generally including the regions traditionally known as Meroe, Napata, Nubia,
and later, Axum. Hence, “Ethiopianism” derives from the biblical term “Ethiopia,”
also referred to as Kush or Cush. Peter Gill (2010) claims “The Greeks
gave Ethiopians their modern name— ‘burnt faces’—and applied it to anyone
living south of Egypt” (p1). That is, in classic
documents, Aethiopia appears
as a geographical term which derives from the Greek name “Αἰθιοπία,” meaning people of a “burnt face,”
hence, the Kushitic stock. According to Drusilla Dunjee
Houston, the ancient Cushite empire of Ethiopia “covered three continents and
held unbroken sway for three thousand years” (1985:2). We should also not forget that, in European chronicles and
tradition from the 12th to the 17th centuries, there was
an imaginary powerful Christian kingdom called Ethiopia located between India
and the Middle East of which a legendary patriarch called Prestor John was a
king.
Built around the slogan “Africa for
the Africans!” “Ethiopianism” was a politico-religious ideology of a more
African and relevant Christianity which advocated for the restoration of
traditional way of life and for political and cultural autonomy. Ethiopianism influenced Pan-Africanism and Afrocentrism
as it helped to disseminate the nativist and nationalist dimensions led by the “back to Africa” ideology with
the emergence of the Jamaican black activist Marcus Garvey who promoted the
idea of “African Diaspora”.
“Official Nationalism”: the Ethiopian Practice
The colonial thesis states that, “Ethiopia was created by the Abyssinian
state colonizing its neighboring nations during the scramble for Africa” (Alemayehu
Kumsa 2013, 1112; Asafa Jalata 1993). That is, as widely documented by European travelers and
missionaries (Bruce, Krapf, Harris, de Salviac), the Amhara & Tigre Semitic
stock migrated from the southern Yemeni tribe called Al-Habashat, hence, “Habasha”
(Abyssinia,) and founded the highland Abyssinian state, a premise yet to be
proved further and which Abyssinian elites to date refute as saying the
migration was cultural (religious and linguistic), not a human relocation. Perhaps, it was not by accident that Armah or Al-Najashi, the Christian king of Axum, who reigned about 614-631, gave shelter to the Muslim emigrants, when Prophet Mohammed and his first followers (the Sahabah) fled persecution, the First Hegira.
Abyssinians annexed gradually the
southern surrounding lowlands (Oromoland/Oromia and other ethnicities) in a
classic pattern of empire-building under the reign of Menilik II (1989-1913). In spite of
their common descent, it is fair to say, the Amhara and Tigre elites have been
caught up to this day in a historical conflict, much like between the Christian and Muslim
warlords, and competed for power and to control resources in Oromia
and the south (Mohammed Hassen, 2015; 1990). Given the country’s ethnic
diversity, however, it is not by accident that the Ethiopian state did not survive
the centrifugal dynamics, which gave ethnicity more prominence as a future
source of political dissention and arising nationalism. This rising
ethnic-based political instability against the backdrop of the imperial
“official nationalism” (“we the people”) and the glamorous “Ethiopia First!”
mantra of the Derg regime was re-enforced by the 1995 Constitution which turned
Ethiopia from a melting-pot of cultures into a federation of nine ethno-nations
without real decentralization and equal distribution of power/authority and
resources. John Markakis (2013) discusses in more detail these center-periphery
discrepancies in the historical and contemporary Ethiopia as “two frontiers”
that need to be crossed to guarantee peace, democracy, equity, and sustainable
development in the country.
Some
may argue that both the Amhara and the Tigrayan ruling classes marginalized the
rural population of their own ethnic groups as the oppressed classes of other
ethnic groups (CRU
Report, 2016). In fact, it should be noted that there are
collective shared experiences of violence, famine, and war that peoples in
Ethiopia suffered indiscriminately in the continued process of control and
coercion to ensure political stability and peace by force. However, among some
serious disparities of oppressions and economic exploitations in the south that
have been overlooked include, the marginalizing rural land tenure system of rist (inheritance) in the highland
(north) Orthodox Christian population and gabbar
(serf) in the south, the cultural domination (religious and linguistic), the
discriminatory educational policies, and unfair court system.
Soon after the WWII and the end of the Italian invasion, Haile
Selassie engaged in what Benedict Anderson (1983:80ff) calls “official nationalism”
(Hultin 2003:404; Markakis, 1974). That is, he introduced some cosmetic changes
in reaction to the nationalist movements of the time and a modernization of
traditional polity, the project which coincided in time with the era of
territorial nationalism, decolonization and nation building in Africa. From the view of “official nationalist” discourse, Jan
Hultin shares Walelegne Mekonnen’s critique that “state and history were associated with the culture and
society of Amharic and Tigrinya speakers, whilst other ethnic groups were disparaged and
marginalized,” which had a profound influence on many Oromo students “to start
a search for roots in the history of their own people” (Bulcha 1996: 63; Hultin 2003). In the 1960’s, as the university activist students’
protest took momentum, the question of “Ethiopian-ness” became apparent in the
student’s literary club and the movement’s organ, “Tagel,” (“Struggle”). For
example, the poem titled “Ethiopiawiw Mannew?” (“Who is the Ethiopian?”)
written by the former education minister, Ibsa Gutema, was one such dissident
writing. Although the Oromo question, and that of other ethnicities’, was
belittled to mere “ethnocentrism” and “provincial narrow mindedness,” the
agenda was one of cultural, economic, and political freedom (Asafa Jalata,
1998).
Writing of nationalism, Benedict
Anderson (1992) recounts, “the great polyglot empires that ruled the earth for
hundreds of years from Lisbon, London, Moscow, Vienna, Paris, Istanbul, Madrid,
even Addis Ababa (emphasis mine),
have disintegrated leaving behind only the residue of the Celestial Empire
still more or less standing” (p1). As this long process of disintegration is
also a process of liberation, however, Anderson is right to question this
double-faced nature of the process, namely, integration and designation of
nations around the world.
“Medemer”
(We are One People): A Future Oriented History?
Chanting “Medemer,” like the
“Ethiopia First!” motto of the Derg regime, the task is to reintegrate the
culturally and socio-politically divided ethnicities and ethno-nations in
Ethiopia over the last 27 years and more. To continue to survive as a nation, in
this view, Ethiopian-ness is unavoidable and forceful again. Official
nationalism evokes an emotional power in the people, one that is initiated from
a top down, from the same emphasis on ethnic identity, especially when people
become territorial and defensive of what they consider theirs and who they are
as a people.
In its modern history, Ethiopia has been
presented as an independent modern nation-state and second most populous in
Africa. The modern Ethiopia evolved in 1991 out of the history of oppression
and decades of rebellion and liberation struggles.
Oromia
is one of the nine regional states and is the largest and the most populated
region with above 35 million peoples. In its contemporary history
(after 1991), Ethiopia has been set in a volatile and insecure context of
sociopolitical instability which, among other factors, has been exacerbated by
border and resource-based conflicts, and quest for the disregarded democratic
rights, on the one hand, and demand for loyalty and legitimacy on the other. The
impoverished peoples and the disillusioned members of the political parties,
OPDO (Oromia), ANDM (Amhara), and SEPDF (the Southern Region) in the ruling
party EPRDF led by the Tigrayan TPLF, have been dissatisfied with the dominant
role of the TPLF, the ever-growing human rights violations, and the uneven
distribution of power and resources. Added
to its history of violence, militarism, and its controlling approach to dissent
instead of dialogue, Ethiopia’s political culture does not guarantee EPRDF to
be democratic. Historically, liberation fronts which evolved into governments
claim it a privilege to rule for a life-time than submit to a peaceful power
transfer through a fair and free election (as to be discussed below). Instead of a democratic process of “election,”
by “selection” and political appointment, officials assume power in Ethiopia,
including the incumbent Prime Minister and his predecessors; and as a result, the
government changes and the oppressive system remains in power. As centralization,
control, and coercion continues to perpetuate the rule, public dissent rises
and recurs.
According to one report on historical and
contemporary political settlement in Ethiopia, three factors influence the
whole power transaction: historically, the
legacy of centralization, exclusion, and recurrent conflict, the contemporary TPLF
single-party monopoly, the strong party-government interlace and the state-led
economy which opened ways for crony capitalism and corruption (CRU Report,
2016). The resulting resentment and the growing distrust fueled the
“identity-based mobilization, despite a generally shared sense of
‘Ethiopian-ness’” (CRU Report, 2016).
Nationalism is more than mere sentiment and
grows out of a self-articulated expression of national consciousness which is
in the process of rebirth and intensification among the Oromo people (Asafa
Jalata, 1995). In this context, it would be interesting but beyond the scope of
the present paper to analyze Oromo politicians’ attitude toward this new
Ethiopianism and their agenda in light of the neo-official-nationalism (“we the
people”) being orchestrated around Dr Abiy’s “Medemer”.
It
is not by accident or simply by historical coincidence that Dr. Abiy Ahmed came
to cherish the new light of history to shine on him. It remains
mysterious though how he rose above the crowd when dozens of other perhaps more
notorious figures could stick to power from the TPLF. Today, in Ethiopia, as an outcome of the upsurge of Oromo nationalism,
which has been intensified over the last four years led by Qeerroo, some
neo-official-nationalist feelings are also at the origin of new Ethiopianism,
mainly among the Amhara and other ethnic groups, which is confused with
patriotism. Rather, it is a politico-religious movement aimed at introducing a
subtle way of occupation and spreading cultural domination in Oromia and other
regions. For instance, the increasing number of construction of new Orthodox Christian
churches in Oromia on every dominant space and sacred sites (hilltops, ritual
places, and ancestral grave sites) and flying high on each spot the plain
imperial flag with the three pennants (red, yellow, and green) or with a
crowned lion in the middle holding a staff topped by a cross with ribbons
symbolizing the “Conquering Lion of Judah” are some of the subtle ways of
occupation and cultural domination. In fact, it is when political liberation
is possible that the end of subjugation translates into cultural and socioeconomic
freedom for the oppressed. Next, I will consider with a special
attention measures that need to be taken as a first step to end subjugation and
cultural domination in Oromia.
The “Oromia First!” Trend
In the past, on another platform
(at OSA Conference, July 2016, Washington DC), I put forward three scenarios
for the escalating Oromo civil resistance to bring about a systemic change, and
not just a reform:
a) IF it
obtains a degree of support from the federal armed forces, or at least win
their benevolent neutrality, b) IF the political alliances which supported the status quo governance will gradually
wane, and c) IF a national consensus and urgent pronouncement of unconditional
unity and convention will be reached among the divided Oromo political
organizations and, as a result, IF the national liberation struggle will take a
new momentum under a strong leadership and headed toward a clear direction.
It is this last scenario (c) after
two years that still resonates most and necessitates an immediate action for
the Oromo people to call upon the divided Oromo political parties and to give a
party (or parties) a legitimacy based on commitment to the people’s rightful
concern or that it suffers a legitimacy
deficit if it will not put the people’s demand first (though it is not an
easy task to determine “Who are the
People?”).
Founding
a National Council of Oromia
This section considers the founding
of a National Council of Oromia as a
first step toward transforming the Oromo national liberation struggle into a
more dynamic, inclusive, and better organized active political force based in
Oromia. This urgent need for an inclusive national dialogue among Oromo
political organizations and the general public is compelling at least for two
reasons. First, our struggle for democratic rights has been slowed down by the
Ethiopian regime which seeks to assert and maintain its power indefinitely
using reforms and cosmetic changes, when the use of lethal forces rather
heartens the people and fuels the grievance. Second, while the Oromo national
struggle has been intensified, instead of reorganizing themselves, cooperating
and forming organizational alliance, Oromo political elites are caught up in
dilemma about crusading for “Ethiopian-ness” on one hand and “Oromoness” on the
other. This conundrum has been overextended, hindered the struggle and reduced
it to clashes of interest over power. Consequently, the struggle suffered major
setbacks such as the lack of ideological clarity, purpose, commitment, and
organizational discipline, i.e., transparency and dynamism, among others.
Hence, there are two purposes to
tackle here. First, it is to sketch a Roadmap and increase awareness within
areas that are regarded as important to revitalize the Oromo national
liberation struggle. Second, it is hoped to encourage at the grassroots level
dialogue and collaboration in the Oromo general public, between individuals,
and political organizations that have showed no need or commitment at this
historical juncture to solve practical problems, to identify and put first what
the Oromo people want, not just what political elites want, and to accomplish
tasks collaboratively.
The call for founding a National Council of Oromia and opening a national dialogue is imperative to set a Roadmap for Oromo liberation struggle, to reach a national consensus on the Roadmap and discharge a Union Accord or Convention, and implement it. The problem is crucial because our voices are divided. A house divided against itself cannot stand a turbulent wind. It is anarchic tendency, leadership machismo, and chauvinism to stick to power and maintain own legacy over the liberation of one’s people instead of protecting and transforming the institution once founded with discipline, commitment, and purpose to serve, and lead with audacity. The problem is equally urgent because as we all know Oromia is still bleeding and people are removed from their home. In order to be heard, the Oromo are dying while they are seeking freedom and the right to life.
Hence, I think there is no any
better time than the present for the Oromo to work together toward ideological
clarity and organizational transparency, dynamism, and unity around a common
goal, kaawo, to plan to reach a national consensus, and, so doing, to
emerge as a nation. I strongly believe that it is an honorable and serious
position to take, which should have been taken long before now, but, partly
because of our insensitivity to the dire situation our people suffer, and
partly because of the scandalous manipulation of our elites and our potential
strategic allies by the Ethiopian regime, to our shame we didn’t take a serious
action to unite, to defend our people and save our cause from stagnation. Nationalism
can easily degenerate into chauvinism where political elites resist against
dynamism and refuse to change and to involve the youth in leadership. Being
youth by itself is problematic in Africa and Oromia/Ethiopia is no exception.
Being Youth in Oromo
Context
The marginalization of youth has
become a world-wide concern. In his analysis of the prospect of youth in
Africa, Jon Abbink portrays the bleak picture of the debilitating situation of
African youth by the following examples: fierce competition for limited resources,
decline in their well-being and social advancement, exclusion from political
arena, marginalization in national state policies, increasing mass
unemployment, health problems, crisis within the family due to poverty, and a
lack of education and skills (Abbink 2005:1). To escape out of this dreadful
situation which denied them “intentionality of action and agency” and
“constructive social incentives,” Abbink adds, “African youths are
over-represented in armed rebel or insurgent movements. There is no prospect
that this situation will change for the better in the near future” (p1). I
hasten to agree here that the situation of Oromo youth is no exception; it
necessitates taking some significant and holistic remedial action. To do so, we
need a comprehensive planning. The lack of “constructive social incentives” in
the society, to enable them live an orderly life, to grow and develop, made
African youth look elsewhere for survival and opportunities. Perhaps David
Shinn’s “exit generation” best describes the situation of our educated younger
generation who “seek greater opportunity elsewhere, especially in North
America, Europe, Australia, and even wealthier African countries and Gulf
States” (Shinn, 2003:21).
Little has been said about the role
of Oromo youth in leadership, in resistance against injustices, and challenges
they face in their practical life as refugees, victims of marginalization,
political exclusion and constant persecutions directed at them by the state
structured violence—coercive devices such as police, court, security, and
media. Our youth are historical agents of change. Their role in peaceful social
change is decisive as in leadership. Our youth can be a creative force and a
dynamic source of innovations. Throughout history, they initiated and catalyzed
important changes in political systems and power-sharing dynamics. As they
suffered multiple forms of discrimination, prospects and opportunities,
disillusioned with political leadership and political institutions, excluded
from political and decision-making processes the Oromo youth joined in and
intensified the mass-based Qeerroo-led resistance, which spread like a wildfire
throughout Oromia and ignited other protests in Ethiopia, and consequently,
they brought about a government change and other reforms. Thus, the youth
became “ungovernable” and remained politically active through the “political
movement” (the protest), instead of, I believe, engaging with and in political
parties.
A few generations ago, our youth
grew up and lived, relatively speaking, in a more integrated society which is
now internally divided along political parties into disordered wholes. Poverty
and destitution, violence, migration, disease, unemployment, displacement and
the breakdown of the family are some of the heart ranching experiences that
drive the Oromo youth (Qeerroo & Qarree) to join #Oromoprotest. We all have
a calling in our time. Sometimes our calling is closer than we think: now we
have a calling to save our society from a systemic disorder and fragility by saving
the young generation and calling upon our political elites to put OROMIA FIRST!
It has become our responsibility now more than ever to transform the mass
movement into a more systematic movement under organized leadership than a
chaotic ordinary “ungovernability”.
The “Ungovernability”
Thesis
The ungovernability thesis presupposes
a condition of institutional insufficiency, a potential of political crisis,
and subsequent institutional change. Over the last few years, we observed a
political crisis in Ethiopia, a wider gap between a “tolerable”/“adequate” and
“insufficient” levels of capacity of the regime to control and govern the
situation in Oromia, which indicates successful ungovernability (Scott, 2009). The state was
chronically paralyzed in its ability not only to provide basic services but
also to resolve major conflicts through adequate and tolerable institutional
means. Subsequently, as we all know, the state actors themselves came to admit
that a condition of defective state capacity was present and that it had to be
healed through institutional reform, which actually necessitates systemic
changes.
Three problems are at stake related
to “ungovernability” thesis. First, the diagnosis of ungovernability is often
linked to seeking a remedial response by the dictatorial regime, by any means
possible, including lethal force. Failure to do so leads the regime to risk the
demolition of authority. Second, in spite of its remedial action, including
reform or subduing the protest by lethal force, the public grievance will rise
and distrust will increase. Third, if the ultimate goal of resistance is a
subsequent institutional change through “ungovernability,” what next? A mere
public mob, a disorganized mass movement by itself, will not guarantee a
long-lasting peace and democratic rights.
So, what happens to the cone, when the cheese is gone? That is, what
happens when the government changes and the oppressive system remains in power?
The question remains, what happens in the absence of a well-organized
institution on the ground, primarily to protect the people, and, to keep the
liberation struggle on the right track? Or, should we risk our people to suffer
an indefinite and unbearable disintegration and institutional dysfunctions?
The ultimate goal of emancipatory
resistance is not just “ungovernability” and reform in the status quo. An emancipatory resistance serves two purposes. First,
for the oppressed it is a means to permit the sense of freedom from all that is dehumanizing force and freedom
to exercise full democratic rights
as self by overcoming fear and liquidating the internalized oppression,
i.e. decolonizing the self, as a prelude to complete liberation and
self-recovery (Memmi, 1961/1991). Second, it
would serve to awaken the attitudes of the oppressor to the reality of the
inherent brutality they impose on the oppressed, the concept which Frantz Fanon
developed in his idea of “violence as purgatory”.
Liberation
Struggle: Progresses and Problems
In the history of African
liberation struggles against oppressive regimes or colonialists, the transition
from liberation to government is not an easy task. This is true to the Tigrayan
TPLF, the Eritrean EPLF, the South Sudanese SPLA, and even to the South African
ANC, Christopher Clapham maintains, “one of the world’s best known and most
admired liberation movements” (Clapham 2012:1). The challenges and criticism
that ANC faced in its centennial year over its quality of governance is a
typical example of difficulty faced during a transition from liberation to
government in Africa, which led to the need for an international dialogue (the
Brenthurst Discussion) of leading struggle veterans, policy makers and experts
held in October 2012, in South Africa (p4). In one instance, the South African
ANC policy, among other several goals it pursued, has been the Black Economic
Empowerment (BEE), which “benefited mainly politically-connected individuals
rather than the mass of the previously disadvantaged” and the “corporate sector
continues to be dominated—managed and owned—by the minority whites” (Tangri and
Southall, 2008: 699). What is more, leaders of liberation struggle are
committed to the rightness of the cause and the entitlement and responsibility
to continue to exercise the power; they consider power as “the culmination of a
lifetime mission,” not as a result of a popular vote (p6). Clapham adds, “it is
very hard indeed for them to recognize that anyone else could have any
equivalent right to rule” (p6). Today’s divided champions of the liberation
struggle, no doubt, will result in an undemocratic, corrupt and insecure
governance, to say the least, wrecked by strife and rivalry.
Historically, in the Oromo context,
the acts of liberation struggle and resistance conducted in distinct
separations from a broad mass movement faced serious setbacks. The hopes of
those who thought, through sporadic acts of non-violent resistance alone, to
set off “only ungovernability now” would be sufficient have proved to be
unjustified. Without a strong leadership and clearly set goals, the revolts
which broke out at different times in isolated parts of Oromia met with very
harsh repressions and were thus crushed but survived repeated stresses to
result in major reforms.
Oromia
at a Crossroads
Our political leaders, Janus-like,
look in two directions: in and out. Like the Salale elder said, eight years
ago, Mana
hin jirru, ala hin jirru, that
is, we are not here, nor there. We have been told Ethiopia is at a
crossroads of democratization or disintegration. And today Oromia is at a
crossroads of Oromia-ness and Ethiopian-ness, the problem which has
been disregarded by Oromo political leaders and scholars, as by the general
public. As we have been divided along these ideological fault-lines for over
the last two decades, we couldn’t act like a “self” to actualize the
long-awaited liberation and “self-determination,” and to emerge as a nation.
Instead, Oromia is now a much reduced place where there is rampant poverty, and
social and economic disintegration, and the Oromo enjoy a problematic status,
to say the least. Let us not forget that until we encountered a social
formation branded by chiefdoms, kingdoms, state, and a leadership of
hierarchical behavior, we lived and practiced an egalitarian behavior in a
society of autonomous communities who appeared to live in harmony as essentially
political equals under the principles of the gadaa system. It is this
egalitarian behavior to this day that disapproves an authoritative, a bossy-type
top-down leadership. To avoid institutional containment, stagnation of our
liberation struggle, and the predictable transitional difficulties, we need to
establish and practice conventions of peaceful political interaction capable of
serving a purpose and surviving the demise of the movement itself.
At the moment, it seems, two sets
of forces are in conflict in our “Self”. The first force tends to hinge us to
the disempowering past, in the firm grip of malfunctioning and failing state in
the name of “Unity in Diversity” and secure territorial integrity (Ethiopian-ness). It regresses backward out of fear,
fear of independence, freedom, and separateness, and fear of the Unknown. From
a folklorist point of view, this defeatist tendency of a backsliding Self
reminds us of Aesop’s fable, “The Fox and the Grapes” in which a hungry fox
tries to eat grapes from a hanging vine but cannot reach them. And rather than
to admit defeat, the fox states that the grapes
are undesirable, hence “sour grapes”. To this first set of our Self, “freedom” has
become like the unreachable “sour grape” for our political leaders!
To the contrary, the second set of
force propels us forward toward wholeness and uniqueness of Self, i.e., Oromummaa
(Oromoness). It thrusts us in the direction of confidence in the face of an
unbearable agony and confusion about the interface between the phases of the
ongoing national liberation struggle, namely, the phases of freedom from and
freedom to. On one hand, in the process of freedom from, the
Oromo are not only struggling to escape from the totalitarian “state” but also
diverting from the very “state form” itself (“a nation without state”) in the
absence of dynamic leadership. On the other, in the process of freedom to, our
people are engaged in an UNLIKELY odyssey in search for “self-
determination”—“unlikely” because of the absence of a clear kaawoo, i.e.,
a comprehensive normative vision called ideology based on Oromummaa
(Oromoness), and a unifying political program to adhere to. To tackle the
challenge, we need some anchoring principles, overarching conventions that are
constituted newly by involving young leadership or one that is inherited,
contested, and reinvented over time.
A
Way Forward: The Roadmap
Purposes of founding a National Council of Oromia include:
·
To
reach a national consensus through
inclusive dialogue
Through inclusive national
dialogue, ideas can be shared, perspectives can be challenged, and differences
can be argued and tolerated and, ultimately, reason/justice will prevail, and
attempts can be made to persuade others the logic of one’s arguments through accountable
talks.
· To bring to a round table issues of
legitimacy and legitimacy deficit
Hypothetically, if a political
front, organization or party fails to defend its political program and
policies, if it claims to represent the people but has no voice of the people
at the general assembly, araddaa nagaa, i.e., a delegate known and
recognized as such by the general public, the party, organization, or front
suffers a legitimacy deficit.
And the National Council will
deliberate on the matter and determine the fate of the polity in question, and
to facilitate for the transition from “Liberation” to “Government”. Now it is
time to focus on creating a platform for an inclusive and democratic dialogue
at grassroots level and to open venue toward a National Debate around the
future of Oromo and Oromia in the absence of organized leadership but, instead,
multiple political programs and ideologies are mushrooming.
·
To
open venue for exercising a democratic politics of representation
Representation here is assigning
meaning to events, situations, social practices, objects, and thoughts as
preferable, appropriate, and correct among competing groups. That is, through
accountable talks practicing the politics of representation is competing over
meaning among groups peacefully and democratically. Despite differences of
perspectives (political, ideological) held by the parties involved, it is hoped
that the mode of politics of representation can lead to achievement of the
culture of peace through open dialogue (a responsible talks).
· To help emerge the mechanisms of consensus-building and deadlock-breaking
· To instill ideas for convening the First National Dialogue Conference:
·
To
chart a Roadmap for the struggle, i.e., to develop a framework and
steps of the Roadmap for Oromo national struggle which will include:
-opening
a framework for Political Dialogue
-ratifying
the Framework
-organizing
meetings and/or conferences to be held periodically to advance the objective of
the Council (NCO) by zones, districts, and kebeles in Oromia, and in states,
regions and localities in the Diaspora to discuss the Roadmap with fair representations
from all parts
-implementing
the Union Accord (Convention) as
planned
In sum, in this task of
involving the people actively in decision-making processes about what directly affects
their lives and the environment in which they live, it should be noted that the
participation of the young people in formal institutional political activities must
be taken into consideration. This
measure will democratize the representativeness of the political system and
minimizes the disenfranchisement of young people, where the political culture of
the country disregards the eligibility of the youth (Qeerroo & Qarree) to
have voice in the national parliamentary system.
Conclusion
It was not the purpose of this paper to focus on what
documented events or aspects of his life as a leader in the EPRDF laid the
ground for PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed and set his supporters to forge facts into fancies
of the neo-official-nationalism (Ethiopianism) inscribed in
“Medemer”. Rather, the purpose of the paper has been to assess the historical
and contemporary factors that led to mythologizing a personality cult as a
requisite characteristic of myth-making around PM Dr. Abiy, another subject of
the “Great Man Theory” after the late Meles Zenawi (Assefa T. Dibaba, 2013),
and a hero who is promising to fulfill this mythic vision of “Medemer,” an
ideological creed for the neo-official nationalism (Ethiopianism). I argued that “Medemer” is an integrationist
attitude counter to the reality on the ground—the historical and contemporary
factors that prompted diversity, ethnicity, and nationalism, instead of the historically
repressive and territorially motivated “unity” in spite of “diversity”.
I stressed that, at the moment, to
advance the Oromia First! Trend, at
least two missions matter most to us. First, the urgent necessity for our
people, a significant number of whom have been expelled from their ancestral
home, is to put pressure on our political leaders to engage in an open dialogue
and to work together to reach a National
Consensus, which does not necessarily mean to reject diverse political
views. Second, to found a National
Council of Oromia, which leads toward a peaceful transition from liberation
struggle to a democratic government. This level of Oromo nationalism (the
OROMIA FIRST! Trend) is what one can have mixed feelings about at present but
it is the major goal of the National Council of Oromia (NCO) to pave venue
toward this edge of our Nationalism— according to the National Consensus to be
reached at eventually: to build an independent state of Democratic Republic of
Oromia or a free state in a democratized federated Ethiopia.
Before I go, I should make these two final cases. First, to my readings, so far, there has been NO single linguistic or historical evidence to argue FOR the “OUTSIDE AFRICA” “ORIGIN THEORY,” at least, of the Oromo (of the Cushitic stock), as there is plenty of such evidences for Abyssinians (of the Semitic stock). However, my purpose has not been to consider the “ORIGIN” of this culture or that ethnicity but to highlight the “BEGINNING”. iSecond, by the Oromo principle of the-seven-generations (akaakilee-abaabilee-torba), any decision a generation makes will have a lasting consequence on seven generations to come. So, the question is simple: should we stand united and change our fate or leave the debts past overdue by seven generations to come?
Before I go, I should make these two final cases. First, to my readings, so far, there has been NO single linguistic or historical evidence to argue FOR the “OUTSIDE AFRICA” “ORIGIN THEORY,” at least, of the Oromo (of the Cushitic stock), as there is plenty of such evidences for Abyssinians (of the Semitic stock). However, my purpose has not been to consider the “ORIGIN” of this culture or that ethnicity but to highlight the “BEGINNING”. iSecond, by the Oromo principle of the-seven-generations (akaakilee-abaabilee-torba), any decision a generation makes will have a lasting consequence on seven generations to come. So, the question is simple: should we stand united and change our fate or leave the debts past overdue by seven generations to come?
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